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Open Code Governance
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The legitimacy of the administrative state has troubled
courts and scholars for many decades. 1 Reformers have pursued
several approaches. Public participation allays concerns that
agency policymaking excludes divergent perspectives and may
partially substitute for direct democratic control. 2 Strong oversight by politically accountable actors enhances the democratic
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1 See, for example, Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U Chi L Rev 1, 8 (1995) (while detailing the different approaches taken by
the Reagan, H.W. Bush and Clinton presidencies, finding that “[t]he key task for those
interested in regulatory performance is to find ways of simultaneously promoting economic and democratic goals”).
2 Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building 164 (Johns Hopkins 2d ed 1983) (explaining that “mass participation may be one of the major innovative forces in developing new issues and refining
old issues that have remained on the formal agenda for some time”); Stuart Langton,
Citizen Participation in America: Current Reflections on the State of the Art, in Stuart
Langton, ed, Citizen Participation in America: Essays on the State of the Art 7 (Lexington
1978) (explaining that “citizen participation has developed as an alternative means of
monitoring government agencies”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative
State 169 (Yale 1985) (arguing that the dignitary model is both necessary and sufficient to
structure a conversation about public values); Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where, and
How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 Georgetown L J
525 (1972) (arguing that broadened public participation improves the administrative
decisionmaking process, giving decisions greater legitimacy and acceptance); Steven Kelman, Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in Public Policymaking, 11 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 178, 180 (1992) (arguing that public participation
allows for cooperationist institutions to solve problems among themselves).
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nature of agency decisions. 3 Agencies’ expertise is said to produce rational policies insulated from politics. 4
Little attention has been paid to how information technologies might advance these efforts. To date, the main contribution
of digital technologies is e-Rulemaking. 5 Yet e-Rulemaking does
little more than re-package the twentieth-century approach to
policymaking, 6 which itself has proven problematic. 7 This barely
touches information technology’s potential for improving the legitimacy of the administrative state.
Information systems offer that opportunity. Agencies increasingly transfer crucial responsibilities to computer systems.
Computers gather and interpret important data. For example,
electronic machines record and calculate votes. Information systems incorporate and apply policy, making decisions about important individual rights, such as a person’s ability to receive
public benefits. 8 And computers store sensitive information, in-

3 See Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 Colum L Rev 1 (1994) (arguing that the President should be the primary overseer of
agencies within particular limits).
4 See Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through
Mutual Adjustment 137–41 (Free Press 1965) (explaining how insulating decisionmakers
from the need to consider all possible value judgments leads to more rational decisionmaking); Thomas O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis
in the Federal Bureaucracy 10 (Cambridge 1991) (explaining the essential elements of
rational decisionmaking).
5 The term e-Rulemaking refers to the use of digital technologies to enhance the
public’s understanding of, and participation in, agency notice-and-comment rulemaking.
To that end, the federal government’s Regulations.gov website allows the public to search,
view, and comment on certain proposed rules. E-Gov Website, E-Rulemaking, available at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/egov/c-3-1-er.html> (last visited Apr 24, 2008) (describing public launch of Regulations.gov website, a “cross agency front-end web application
that posts and allows comments on proposed federal agency rules”). Some scholars have
embraced e-Rulemaking efforts as a means to democratize agency policymaking. See Beth
S. Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 Emory L J 433, 435–36 (2004)
(discussing e-Rulemaking as a way to reform the administrative process).
6 Stuart M. Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political
Institutions, 55 Duke L J 893, 897, 923–29 (2006) (arguing that proponents and skeptics of
e-Rulemaking have not considered the role of the courts and Congress in the larger administrative law context and contending that e-Rulemaking efforts will exact high costs
with little net benefit).
7 See John M. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation: How Overregulation Causes Underregulation at OSHA 7–16 (MIT 1988) (complaining that agencies
skirt informal rulemaking process due to its cost by making policy in other ways); Jerry L.
Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle
Safety, 4 Yale J Reg 257 (1987) (explaining how the cumbersome rulemaking process has
caused the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to abandon ambitious safety
regulations in favor of a recall procedure).
8 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash U L Rev 1249, 1260–67
(2008).
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cluding federal employees’ personal data. 9 Because these systems profoundly affect the public, the ability to monitor them is
essential to the administrative state’s transparency, participatory nature, rationality, and hence its democratic legitimacy.
These systems, however, are opaque. Because these systems’
software is proprietary, the source code—the programmers’ instructions to the computer—is secret. Closed source code 10 leaves
users unable to discern how a system operates and protects itself. Thus, users have difficulty detecting programming errors
that disenfranchise voters 11 and undercount communities for the
census. Programming mistakes that distort established policy
routinely remain hidden from view.
These systems’ opacity interferes with important administrative law values. Closed code prevents public participation in
agency decisions incorporated in these systems. Unlike interested members of the public who have opportunities to collaborate in policymaking through comments on proposed rules,
stakeholders cannot provide feedback on agency decisions that
they cannot see. 12 At the same time, opaque systems impair the
administrative state’s political accountability. 13 The public cannot hold elected officials responsible for broken systems without
opportunities to learn about these systems’ problems. Closed sys9 See, for example, Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of
Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S Cal L Rev 241, 248–49
(2007).
10 Wikipedia, Proprietary Software, available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Proprietary_software> (last visited Apr 24, 2008). Throughout this Article, I will refer to
systems whose source code is closed to the public as “closed systems.” I also will refer to
closed source code as “closed code.” The instructions that run computers actually constitute several layers of code. Aviel D. Rubin, Brave New Ballot: The Battle to Safeguard
Democracy in the Age of Electronic Voting 3 (Morgan Road 2006). Source code provides the
basic instructions to the computer. A program known as a compiler converts the source
code into object code, a stream of ones and zeros comprehensible only to machines that
runs inside the computer.
11 Earl Barr, Matt Bishop, and Mark Gondree, Fixing Federal E-Voting Standards,
Commun of the Assoc for Computing Machinery 19, 21 (Mar 2007) (arguing that opencode systems allow users to locate and repair flaws that would not be repaired under a
closed system).
12 See Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies, in Joseph Feller, et al, eds,
Perspectives on Free and Open Source Software 349, 358 (MIT 2005) (explaining that any
law embedded in code is effectively “secret law”).
13 Frank Pasquale and Oren Bracha are engaged in an important enterprise regarding the opacity and lack of accountability in the operation of search engines. Oren Bracha
and Frank A. Pasquale III, Federal Search Commission?: Access, Fairness and Accountability in the Law of Search, Cornell L Rev (forthcoming 2008); Frank A. Pasquale III,
Taking on the Known Unknowns, Concurring Opinions (Aug 12, 2007), available at
<http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/08/taking_on_the_k.html> (last visited Apr 24, 2008).

4/29/2008 5:04:26 PM

358

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2008:

tems also undermine an agency’s expertise by applying distorted
policy and by closing off opportunities for the broader technical
community to provide valuable feedback on systems’ security and
accuracy.
This Article proposes opening up these black boxes to improve the quality and democratic legitimacy of agencies’ decisionmaking. My proposal would require vendors to release certain
systems’ source codes for public review. High profile systems,
such as e-voting machines, would command the attention of a
wide array of technical experts, 14 while other automated systems
would likely be studied by affected interest groups. 15
Thus, an open code 16 model could invigorate the participatory model of the administrative state. In recent years, the cost
and delay of involving the public has tempered enthusiasm for
participatory approaches to administrative law. 17 This proposal
would secure valuable public input while reducing the cost of
obtaining it.
This proposal should appeal to advocates of strong central
executive leadership. Open code will allow politically accountable
actors, such as presidents and governors, to oversee agencies
more directly. By contrast, closed code leaves those officials dependent on junior subordinates for accounts of what agencies’
automated systems are doing and why.
At the same time, the input of programmers advances administrative law’s goal of marshalling expertise to improve governance. Going back to Judge Landis and Justice Frankfurter,
judges and scholars have argued that rational policy is best
14 See notes 174–83 and accompanying text discussing technical community’s interest
in reviewing source code of e-voting systems.
15 See note 184 and accompanying text discussing stakeholders interested in automated systems.
16 This Article uses the term “open code” to refer to software whose source code is
available for public review. In using this term, I distinguish open code software from
“open source software” or “free software,” whose source code is similarly revealed to the
public but also enjoys relaxed licensing terms. Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies at
358 (cited in note 12); Jesus M. Gonzalez-Barahona and Gregorio Robles, Libre Software
in Europe, in Chris DiBona, Danese Cooper, and Mark Stone, eds, Open Sources 2.0: The
Continuing Evolution 161 n 1 (O’Reilly 2006); L. Jean Camp, Varieties of Software and
their Implications for Effective Democratic Government, 135 Proceedings of the British
Academy 183 (2006), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
905277> (last visited Apr 24, 2008). This Article leaves aside the question of the licensing
regime that should govern such software, such as whether the software would be free to
use, modify, or sell.
17 See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw U L Rev 173, 217–18 (1997) (explaining how increased participation greatly increases the costs of ordinary agency decisions).
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achieved through expert scrutiny of difficult problems. 18 This
model, however, depends on expert agencies having sufficient
data to make optimal decisions. 19 Open code makes new programming and system design expertise relevant and available to
the administrative state. 20
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a typology of closed systems used by administrative agencies. It identifies two serious problems that closed systems conceal: programming errors that cause inaccurate results and security vulnerabilities that can lead to serious problems, such as identity theft
and election fraud.
Part II articulates the contours of an open code model. It
then lays the normative foundations for such a regime, exploring
how open code advances critical administrative law values of
participation, political accountability, and expertise. 21 Part II
argues that this proposal favoring open code would render
agency decision-making mechanisms embedded in these systems
more transparent, participatory, and expert.
Part III discusses three potential objections to an open code
model. First, will switching from closed systems to an open code
model be unduly costly? This Article argues that short-term costs
should be balanced against the long-term gains that transparency brings. Second, will only high profile systems, such as evoting, generate feedback, leaving the rest of these systems unexamined? This Article answers this question in the negative and
explains that openness will provide important benefits even if
these systems are not actually reviewed. Third, does an open
code regime compromise privacy and security? The computer security literature rejects a “security through obscurity” regime
and underscores the importance of openness to identify security
18 James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 6–46 (Yale 1938); Henry H. Perritt,
Jr, The Electronic Agency and the Traditional Paradigms of Administrative Law, 44
Admin L Rev 79, 88–89 (1992).
19 Stephen G. Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 102–
03 (Knopf 2005).
20 Vladi Finotto and Angela Forte, Re-Use of Solutions and Open Source Software in
Public Administrations, in Eleonora Di Maria and Stefano Micelli, eds, On Line Citizenship: Emerging Technologies for European Cities 140 (Springer 2005) (“By liaising with
open source software developer communities, local public administrations can adopt a
specific application and contribute to its evolution while enjoying the benefits of full access to a global pool of experts and developers ready to fix problems and suggest solutions.”).
21 Naturally, each of these models of administrative law has been subject to criticism.
This Article does not address those debates but instead endeavors to show how the varying models of administrative law would support this proposal.
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vulnerabilities. This Article concludes by offering some refinements to the proposal described in Part II.
I. CLOSED CODE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Information systems used by agencies bring important benefits to the administrative state. For instance, automated systems
cut costs, allowing agencies to manage data efficiently, 22 and
they apply policy in a uniform manner. This Part provides a typology of systems whose source code is closed and then explores
the problems they raise.
A.

Typology of Closed Systems

Agencies employ closed systems in one of three types. 23 The
first type collects and processes information. 24 A prominent type
of data processing system is electronic voting machines. After the
passage of the Help America Vote Act in 2002, 25 municipalities,
counties, and states rushed to buy electronic voting systems 26
that record and tally votes. 27 Private vendors build e-voting systems, incorporating both commercial off-the-shelf software and
their own software. 28 Election Systems & Software (“ES&S”),
22 William D. Eggers, Government 2.0: Using Technology to Improve Education, Cut
Red Tape, Reduce Gridlock, and Enhance Democracy 29 (Rowman and Littlefield 2005).
23 This Article does not endeavor to present an exhaustive taxonomy of information
systems used by agencies. Instead, it categorizes information systems that have a profound effect on public policy and important individual rights and whose opacity impacts
important administrative law values.
24 This Article refers to such systems as “data processing systems.”
25 The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”) established a program to “provide
funds to States to replace punch card voting systems” with e-voting systems. Pub L No
107-252, 116 Stat 1666 (2002), codified at 42 USC §§ 15301–15545 (Supp 2004). HAVA
authorized the annual release of over a billion dollars to fund state upgrades of voting
equipment for fiscal years 2003–2005. 42 USC § 15407 (Supp 2004).
26 This Article uses the terms “e-voting systems” and “e-voting machines” to refer to
computerized systems that record in electronic form voters’ selections. E-voting systems,
of course, come in varying types, such as Direct Recording Electronic systems (“DREs”)
without paper trails, DREs with Voter-Verifiable Paper Trails, and Precinct Count Optical Scans. See Brennan Center for Justice, The Machinery of Democracy: Voting System
Security, Accessibility, Usability, and Cost 2–4 (Brennan Center 2006), available at
<http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_38150.pdf> (last visited
Apr 24, 2008).
27 Rubin, Brave New Ballot at 13 (cited in note 10).
28 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Elections of the House Committee on House
Administration, 110th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (Mar 15, 2007) (testimony of Professor David
Wagner), available at <http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/testimony-house07.pdf>
(last visited Mar 6, 2008) (hereinafter Wagner Testimony) (stating that “a voting system
vendor like Diebold might license software from Microsoft for use in their touchscreen
voting machine”). Those vendors typically do not have permission to provide the source
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Diebold, Sequoia, and Avante manufacture most of this country’s
e-voting systems. 29
E-voting systems use proprietary software. 30 As a result,
election officials, candidates, technical experts, and interested
citizens typically cannot inspect the source code to ensure the
software works correctly. 31 Courts provide trade secret protection
to the source code, refusing access to it even in cases where programming errors allegedly caused election irregularities. 32
Another data processing system is the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (“CPS”). CPS uses Windows-based software that processes interviews and aggregates census data to
determine the amount of federal aid distributed to state and local
governments, including housing assistance, public benefits, and

code to others.
29 See The Machinery of Democracy at 2–4 (cited in note 26) (cataloging manufacturers of various systems). More than 150,000 voting machines in use around the country
are Diebold systems. Kim Zetter, Diebold to Change Its Name, Wired (Aug 16, 2007),
available at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/diebold-to-chan.html> (last visited
Feb 24, 2008).
30 Bev Harris, Black Box Voting 26 (Plan Nine 2004); Rubin, Brave New Ballot at 13
(cited in note 10).
31 Wagner Testimony at 2 (cited in note 28). Because each state has its own election
laws, voting equipment must meet state requirements and federal voting system guidelines, which have been adopted by most states. Lisa Vaas, U.S. e-Voting Lags, e-Week, 26
(Aug 13, 2007). Federal voting standards ask vendors to share their source code with a
testing laboratory selected by the vendor. Id. Such voting systems testing laboratories
must be accredited by the Election Assistance Commission. Id. Only fifteen states require
manufacturers, in some manner, to place source code in escrow for examination. Verified
Voting Foundation, Escrow of Voting Software (April 17, 2007), available at <http://
www.verifiedvoting.org/downloads/EscrowProvisions.pdf> (last visited Apr 24, 2008).
32 See Christine Jennings v Elections Canvassing Commissionn of Florida, 958 S2d
1083 (Fla App 2007) (denying petition for certiorari to review district court’s refusal to
compel discovery of e-voting machines’ source code); Ryan Paul, Court: Protecting Trade
Secrets Takes Priority over Election Transparency, Ars Technica (June 25, 2007), available
at
<http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070625-florida-appeals-court-says-tradesecret-protection-takes-priority-over-election-transparency.html> (last visited Feb 24,
2008).

4/29/2008 5:04:26 PM

362

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2008:

unemployment. 33 Census 2000 affected the allocation of over two
trillion dollars. 34
The second type of automated system executes policy and
renders decisions about individuals. 35 Programmers building
these systems translate policy into code. 36 For example, automated public benefits systems suggest eligibility determinations
and benefit calculations to case workers. 37 Similarly, the Internal
Revenue Service uses a decision-making system that identifies
individuals who should be subject to tax audits. 38
The third type of closed system stores and disseminates sensitive information. 39 For instance, data storage systems collect
contract data for the Department of Homeland Security. 40 State
election boards maintain databases of eligible voters. 41 State and
federal agencies store the sensitive personal information of em33 Email from Fran Horvath, Office of Employment & Unemployment Statistics,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, to Alice B. Johnson, Research Fellow, University of Maryland
School of Law (Sept 20, 2007) (on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum)
(“Horvath Email”). The Current Population Survey (“CPS”) is collected by the Census
Bureau on behalf of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Id. Once interviews are collected,
closed code software known as Blaise processes the information. Id. The Bureau uses
these products to aggregate micro data, which is seasonally adjusted. Id. Seasonal adjustments are made by a software program that is open code and available to the public
for downloading. Id; US Census Bureau, The X-12-ARIMA Seasonal Adjustment Program,
available at <http://www.census.gov/srd/www/x12a/> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Kenneth
Prewitt, The US Decennial Census: Political Questions, Scientific Answers, 26 Population
& Dev Rev 1, 5–6 (2000).
34 Prewitt, 26 Population and Dev Rev at 6 (cited in note 33). Given these stakes, it is
“no surprise that there is a partisan edge to the focus on census numbers.” US Government Accountability Office, Rep No GAO-06-567, Federal Assistance: Illustrative Simulations of Using Statistical Population Estimates for Reallocating Certain Federal Funding
3–4 (2006) (explaining that Census data determines federal grant programs such as
Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, National School Lunch Program,
Head Start, transit grants, child support enforcement, state administrative matching for
food stamp program, public housing funds, and unemployment insurance).
35 This Article refers to the second type of automated system as “decision-making
systems.”
36 See Citron, 85 Wash U L Rev at 1260–61, 1281–88 (cited in note 8) (addressing the
due process problems raised by decisionmaking systems).
37 California, Colorado, Texas, and Florida employ such systems. See Terry Sapp,
Making Things Happen, 64 Policy & Practice 40 (June 1, 2006) (discussing the use of
public benefits system in California); Cynthia V. Fukami and Donald J. McCubbrey,
Colorado Benefits Management System (B): The Emperor’s New System, 18 Commun of
the Assoc for Info Sys 488 (2006) (discussing the new benefits management system in
Colorado).
38 Camp, 135 Proceedings of the British Academy 183 (cited in note 16).
39 This Article refers to the third type as “data storage systems.”
40 Ellen Nakashima and Brian Krebs, Contractor Faulted in DHS Data Breach, Wash
Post A1 (Sept 24, 2007).
41 Jennifer Granick, Let Post-Election Debugging Begin, Wired (Nov 8, 2006), available at <http://www.wired.com/politics/law/commentary/circuitcourt/2006/11/72083> (last
visited Feb 24, 2008).
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ployees and citizens. 42 The Environmental Protection Agency’s
data registry collects information about firms’ environmentallyrelated activities that is then released in an annual report. 43
B.

Problems of Closed Systems
1. Inaccuracy.

Programming errors in closed systems frequently cause inaccurate findings. 44 Such errors are particularly common in data
processing and decision-making systems. As this section explains, software errors can disenfranchise voters, undercount
communities for the census, and distort policies in automated
public benefits systems.
In hundreds of instances, e-voting machines have lost or
added votes. 45 In November 2006, e-voting systems in Florida
failed to record eighteen thousand ballots in a hotly contested
congressional race. 46 During the 2006 primaries, e-voting machines in Cuyahoga County, Ohio made serious errors: “in 72.5
42 See Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age 182 (NYU 2004); Citron, 80 S Cal L Rev at 295 (cited in note 9).
43 Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and
Governance, 23 Harv Envir L Rev 441, 448 (1999) (discussing federal Toxics Release Inventory). The EPA’s data registry runs on Oracle’s proprietary software. Telephone Interview by Alice B. Johnson with Nathan Wilkes, Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Data Registry (Sept 28, 2007).
44 To be sure, the programming errors and security problems discussed in this section
occur in both open and closed systems. But these problems are particularly troubling in
closed systems as they cannot be easily identified and fixed.
45 Clive Thompson, Can You Count on Voting Machines?, NY Times Magazine 40
(Jan 6, 2008), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/magazine/06Vote-t.html>
(last visited Feb 24, 2008). See also Harris, Black Box Voting at 4–16 (cited in note 30);
Rubin, Brave New Ballot at 61 (cited in note 10) (finding “gross design and programming
errors” in Diebold machines); US Government Accountability Office, Rep No GAO 05-956,
Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems
Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed 2 (2005); Barr, Bishop, and Gondree, Fixing Federal E-Voting Standards at 19 (cited in note 11); Donald P. Moynihan,
Building Secure Elections: E-Voting, Security, and Systems Theory, 64 Pub Admin Rev
515, 519 (2004).
46 Kim Zetter, Academics Call Foul on Florida Test of Voting Machines, Wired (Apr
16, 2007), available at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/04/academics_call_.html>
(last visited Feb 24, 2008). Just before the election, ES&S admitted that its poor software
design risked losing votes. Kim Zetter, Docs Point to E-Voting Bug in Contested Race,
Wired (Apr 17, 2007), available at <http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/
2007/04/evotinganalysis> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Kim Zetter, E-Vote Memo is a
“Smoking Gun,” Wired (Mar 22, 2007), available at <http://www.wired.com/politics/law/
news/2007/03/EVOTE_0322> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Kim Zetter, Ohio Audit Says
Diebold Vote Database May Have Been Corrupted, Wired (Apr 19, 2007), available at
<http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/04/diebold_vote_da.html> (last visited Feb 24,
2008).
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percent of the audited machines, the paper trail did not match
the digital tally on the memory cards.” 47
In 2004, e-voting machines in an Ohio precinct recorded
3,893 votes for President Bush even though only 800 individuals
were registered to vote there. 48 In Indiana, e-voting machines
counted 144,000 votes in a county that only had 5,352 registered
voters. 49 In 2002, Florida’s e-voting machines lost as much as
21.5 percent of the votes in certain counties. 50 In 2000, e-voting
machines in Iowa recorded four million votes when roughly three
hundred ballots were inputted. 51
Local officials caught these errors due to the obvious disparities between the number of votes cast and the number of registered voters. 52 In some cases, official inquiry into these errors led
to the discovery of other problems, including a vendor’s failure to
certify 53 its e-voting machines. 54 But less obvious errors, such as
switching votes from one candidate to another, are much more
likely to go unnoticed. 55 A July 2007 investigative report re47

Thompson, Voting Machines, NY Times Magazine (cited in note 45).
John Schwartz, Glitch Found in Ohio Counting, NY Times A12 (Nov 6, 2004). In
Franklin County, Ohio, an e-voting system reported that Bush received 4,258 votes
against 260 for Kerry in a precinct where only 638 voters had cast ballots. Rubin, Brave
New Ballot at 259 (cited in note 10).
49 Cynthia L. Webb, Cashing in on E-Voting?, Technews.com (Financial Times Nov
13, 2003).
50 Vaas, US e-Voting Lags, e-Week at 26 (cited in note 31). ES&S e-voting machines
failed to count 103,222 votes in Broward County, Florida. More Ballots Found in Florida;
Outcome Same, Omaha World-Herald 6a (Nov 9, 2002).
51 Jim Carlton, Fuzzy Numbers: Election Snafus Went Far Beyond Florida in Year
When it Mattered, Wall St J A1 (Nov 17, 2000).
52 Moynihan, 64 Pub Admin Rev at 519 (cited in note 45).
53 Certification provides independent verification that voting systems comply with
the “functional capabilities, accessibility, and security requirements necessary to ensure
the integrity and reliability of voting systems.” Wikipedia, Certification of Voting Machines, available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiw/Certification_of_voting_machines> (last
visited Feb 24, 2008). Under HAVA, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”)
bears responsibility for accrediting voting system test laboratories and certifying voting
equipment through the Voting System Certification & Laboratory Accreditation Program.
Id. Although federal certification for voting machines is voluntary, most states require
such certification for their voting systems. See also note 31 discussing the EAC’s role in
accrediting e-voting systems.
54 Kim Zetter, ES&S to be Rebuked, Fined and Possibly Banned in CA?, Wired, (Aug
21, 2007), available at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/ess-to-be-rebuk.html>
(last visited Feb 24, 2008) (reporting California’s accusation that ES&S sold it machines
that had not been tested or certified for use). The report also noted that ES&S assembled
its machines in a sweatshop in the Philippines. Id. Due to problems with ES&S e-voting
machines, Sarasota County in Florida committed to switching to Diebold machines in
July 2007. Kim Zetter, Florida County at Center of Election Storm Dumps ES&S in Favor
of Diebold, Wired (June 7, 2007), available at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/06/
florida_county_.html> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
55 Adam Cohen, What’s Wrong with My Voting Machine? NY Times A24 (Dec 4, 2006)
48
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vealed that 30 to 40 percent of ES&S’s e-voting machines under
review changed voters’ selections. 56 Colorado’s Secretary of State
decertified e-voting systems manufactured by ES&S because
tests demonstrated that the machines could not accurately count
votes. 57
Software flaws in e-voting machines raise concerns about the
accuracy of other data processing systems. For instance, programming errors in CPS could result in inequitable funding for
communities. 58 Software flaws that cause miscounts would deny
local jurisdictions funds from federal programs. 59 If CPS undercounts the population in a jurisdiction with concentrations of
groups requiring federal assistance, members of those groups
will be deprived of entitlements that the benefits systems were
designed to provide them. 60
Decision-making systems are also riddled with programming
flaws. When computer programmers translate policy into automated public benefits systems, they often distort it. 61 This is so

(noting reports of “vote flipping” in Broward County, Florida in November 2006 election);
Todd R. Weiss, ‘Vote Flipping’ Is Real, but Its Cause Is the Subject of Debate, Computerworld.com (Nov 13, 2006), available at <http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.
do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=273455> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
56 Kim Zetter, ES&S Discloses Full List of Manufacturers, Wired (Aug 27, 2007),
available at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/ess-discloses-f.html> (last visited
Feb 24, 2008). Further complicating matters is the fact that voter-verified paper trails are
not required in twenty-three states. Ian Urbina and Christopher Drew, Big Shift Seen in
Voting Methods with Turn Back to a Paper Trail, NY Times A1 (Dec 8, 2006) (explaining
that e-voting machines used in Georgia and Maryland do not produce voter-verified paper
trails). Without such paper trails, voters have no means to check if e-voting machines
actually recorded their votes. Adam Cohen, The Good News (Really) About Voting Machines, NY Times (Jan 10, 2007); Steven Levy, Black Box Voting Blues, Newsweek 69
(Nov 3, 2003). But even when e-voting machines produce paper trails, nothing guarantees
that the machines actually recorded the vote as cast or at all.
57 E-Vote: Colorado Tests Voting Equipment, Decertifies Some, Government Technology (eRepublic Dec 18, 2007), available at <http://www.govtech.com/gt/articles/237095?
utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=GTEN%20-%20ENewsletter_2007_12_19> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
58 Prewitt, 26 Population & Dev Rev at 7 (cited in note 33).
59 Id at 8.
60 Id.
61 Pamela Martineau, With Lessons Learned, Yolo Launches CalWIN Program, Sacramento Bee B1 (May 3, 2005) (noting pay discrepancies to welfare and general assistance
recipients due to programming errors); Evelyn Larrubia and Caitlin Liu, County’s Computer System is Botching Medical Benefits Aid, LA Times H1 (Feb 17, 2002) (explaining
that computer errors resulted in denial of prenatal care); Tamara Clark v Department of
Children & Family Services, No 05-2105RP, Petition to Determine Invalidity of Proposed
Rule 65A-1.400 and ESS Online Benefits Application Form 6 (Fla Div Admin Hearings
June 10, 2005) (arguing that relative caregivers could not apply for Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families due to the design of the online application in violation of Florida law).
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for several reasons. Although all translations shade meaning, 62 a
translation of policy from human language into code poses a
more significant risk of radically altering that policy than would
a translation from English to another human language. 63 This is
in part because artificial languages intelligible to computers
have a limited range of key words as compared to human languages. 64 Computer languages thus may be unable to capture a
policy’s nuances. 65
Code writers interpret policy when they translate it from
human language to computer language. 66 Distortions in policy
have been attributed to the fact that programmers building code
lack “policy knowledge.” 67 This is neither surprising nor easily
remedied. Private information technology consultants cannot be
expected to have specialized expertise in regulatory or public
benefits programs. And programmers working for government
agencies tend to work on a wide variety of programs, preventing
them from developing expertise in any given area.
Policy changes may stem from a programmer’s values. 68 Programmers can unconsciously phrase a question in a biased manner. 69 In a complex software system composed of smaller subsys62 See generally Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Johns Hopkins 1976) (Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak trans); see also J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 Yale L J 743, 783–86 (1987).
63 Australian Administrative Review Council, Automated Assistance in Administrative Decision Making 18 (2004), available at <http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.
nsf/VAP/(E671321254BE241EF50E9203E76822F1)~AAADMreportPDF.PDF> (last visited Feb 24, 2008) (hereinafter Aus Admin Rev, Automated Assistance).
64 Id; James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 Yale L J 1719, 1728
(2005).
65 Graham Greenleaf, Andrew Mowbray, and Peter van Dijk, Representing and Using
Legal Knowledge in Integrated Decision Support Systems: DataLex WorkStations, 3 Artificial Intelligence & L 97, 127 (1995).
66 Aus Admin Rev, Automated Assistance at 29 (cited in note 63).
67 Office of Inspector General, Texas Health & Human Services Comm, TIERS/IEES
Review 29 (2007) (copy on file with U Chi Legal F); Deloitte, State of Colorado: CBMS
Post-Implementation Review 9 (May 2005) (copy on file with U Chi Legal F ) (explaining
that incorrect rules embedded in CBMS were in part due to incorrect policy interpretation
by programmers). But see Jessica Weidling, Housing Hopes 47, Government Tech (June
2007) (noting that in “uncharacteristic move for the public sector,” Philadelphia Housing
Authority administrators spent time with software provider to carefully discuss requirements of their automated telephone system).
68 Code embeds the values and choices of the code writer. Lawrence Lessig, Code
Version 2.0 102 (Basic 2006).
69 See Helen Nissenbaum, How Computer Systems Embody Values, Computer 119
(Mar 2001) (explaining that systems can unfairly discriminate against specific sectors of
users); Batya Friedman and Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, 14 Assoc
Computing Machinery Transactions on Info Systems 330, 333 (1996) (describing automated loan program whose system assigns negative value to applicants from certain
locations, such as high-crime or low-income neighborhoods).
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tems, the actual bias of the system “may well be a composite of
rules specified by different programmers.” 70
Inaccuracy can spring from a code writer’s preference for binary questions that are easily translated into code. 71 Policy, however, often involves the weighing of multiple variables. 72 There is
a significant risk that code writers may fail to accurately capture
these nuances given their bias for binary choices. 73 Programmers
also may inappropriately narrow the discretion available to a
system’s users. 74
Distorted policy might also stem from an agency’s decision to
automate policy changes that require, but have not received,
rulemaking procedures. Professor Evelyn Brodkin has studied
frontline bureaucratic routines that create new policy at the
point of delivery. 75 For instance, lower-level bureaucrats often
make policy when established policy is internally contradictory. 76
Such practices produce “street-level” welfare policies that have
not been published and vetted through notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures. 77 Decision-making systems could automate such policy. 78
Whether distorted policy stems from programming errors or
deliberate agency action, the resulting inaccuracy is the same.
Automated public benefits systems in California, Colorado, Florida, and Texas incorporated distorted policies that changed es70

Grimmelmann, 114 Yale L J at 1737 (cited in note 64).
Denise Kersten, Bytes vs. Brains, 37 Government Exec 30 (Sept 1, 2005) (explaining the difficulties that may arise from translating more complex inquiries into code).
72 For example, the Food Stamp Act and federal regulations limit food stamps of
childless adults to three months with six exceptions, which cross reference other exceptions that, in turn, refer to still other exceptions. 7 USC § 2015(o) (2000); 7 CFR § 273.25
(2008). Those writing code may be tempted to impose a three-month rule without the
complicated and arguably confusing exceptions. See David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient?
Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual Rights, 93 Cal L Rev 1051, 1096 n 205
(2005) (discussing potential for eligible workers and those designing notices to read threemonth rule with regard to childless adults seeking food stamps without regard to the
exceptions).
73 Aus Admin Rev, Automated Assistance at 21 (cited in note 63) (stating specific
instances in which allowing an agency officer to override an expert system would be preferable).
74 Id.
75 Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Street-Level Research: Policy at the Front Lines, in Mary Clare
Lennon and Thomas Corbett, eds, Policy into Action: Implementation Research and Welfare Reform 145 (Urban Institute 2003). Brodkin’s important research aims to render this
opaque policy more transparent.
76 Id at 149.
77 Id.
78 Automated street-level welfare policy would require notice-and-comment rulemaking to the same extent that non-automated street-level policy would.
71
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tablished rules, often in violation of federal and state law. For
instance, code writers embedded over nine hundred incorrect
rules into Colorado’s Benefits Management System (“CBMS”)
from September 2004 to April 2007. 79 With one such incorrect
rule, CBMS denied Medicaid to breast and cervical cancer patients based on income and asset limits that were not authorized
by federal or state law. 80 Another distorted rule caused CBMS to
discontinue food stamps to individuals with past drug problems
in violation of Colorado law. 81 In all, CBMS rendered hundreds
of thousands of erroneous eligibility decisions and benefits calculations. 82
2. Security problems.
Data processing systems can have serious security problems.
In 2007, California’s Secretary of State launched an investigation
of the state’s e-voting systems. 83 Teams of computer scientists
found “deep architectural flaws” in the source code of the state’s
e-voting machines. 84 These flaws rendered the e-voting systems
79 See Colorado Benefits Management System, Decision Table Release Notes Covering
2004–2007; Deloitte, CBMS Post-Implementation Review at 10 (cited in note 67) (explaining that there were 175 distinct defects in the Medicaid rules table in 2005). For other
incorrect rules encoded in the system, see Colorado Benefits Management System, Decision Table Release Notes for February 24–25, 2007 19 (Feb 26, 2007) (issuing correction of
code that exempted a child’s earnings in calculating food stamps where the child was the
head of the household in contravention of federal regulations); Colorado Benefits Management System, Decision Table Release Notes for August 12–13, 2006 10 (Aug 11, 2006)
(correcting embedded rule that did not allow Medicare premium as an expense for disabled individual in contravention of federal regulations).
80 Colorado Benefits Management System, Decision Table Release Notes for March
10–11, 2007 10 (Mar 7, 2007) (fixing rule that improperly imposed income limits on
women with breast or cervical cancer in violation of 42 USC § 1396r-1b and Colo Rev Stat
Ann § 25.5-5-308).
81 Colorado Benefits Management System, Decision Table Release Notes for February
3–4, 2007 24 (Feb 1, 2007) (correcting rule embedded in system that contravened Colo Rev
Stat § 26-2-305, which mandates that individuals “shall not be ineligible [for food stamps]
due to a drug conviction unless misuse of food stamp benefits is part of the court findings”).
82 David Migoya, Feds Give Colorado a Big Bill, Denver Post B1 (Apr 12, 2007) (explaining that CBMS made up to 11,000 errors per month).
83 Joseph A. Calandrino, et al, Source Code Review of the Diebold Voting System (July
20, 2007), available at <http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/dieboldsource-public-jul29.pdf> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Matt Blaze, et al, Source Code Review
of the Sequoia Voting System (July 20, 2007), available at <http://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/voting_systems/ttbr/sequoia-source-public-jul26.pdf> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
California could order a review of the source code because it is one of the few states that
mandate submission of the source code into escrow for official review.
84 Calandrino et al, Source Code Review at 10–24 (cited in note 83). The voting machines subject to review were manufactured by Diebold Election Systems, Hart InterCivic, Sequoia Voting Systems, and Elections Systems and Software, Inc. Website of
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vulnerable to attacks and bugs. 85 For instance, the source codes
allowed the insertion of malicious code and viruses that would
alter votes. 86
Reviewers also found the source codes to be too complex to
resist bugs. 87 One vendor incorporated Microsoft’s Windows,
which is notorious for security problems, in its system. 88 All of
the state’s e-voting systems used vulnerable encryption schemes,
often with critical security codes stored in files as plain text. 89
Based on these findings, California’s Secretary of State ordered
vendors to fix the systems and has conditionally recertified them
pending further review. 90 In December 2007, Colorado’s Secretary of State decertified the state’s Sequoia e-voting machines
due to a variety of security risk factors. 91
California Secretary of State Debra Bowen, Top-to-Bottom Review, available at
<http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). In 2003,
computer scientists detected these same flaws when Diebold’s source code was leaked
onto the Internet. Kim Zetter, CA Releases Source Code Review of Voting Machines—New
Security Flaws Revealed; Old Ones Were Never Fixed, Wired (Aug 3, 2007), available at
<http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/ca-releases-sou.html> (last visited Jan 23,
2008); Moynihan, 64 Pub Admin Rev at 520 (cited in note 45). See also text accompanying
notes 125–26 (discussing the communities that uncovered and publicized the flaws in
Diebold’s e-voting machines in 2003).
85 Wagner Testimony at 2 (cited in note 28) (describing the inadequacy of testing
laboratories in finding security flaws); Calandrino, et al, Source Code Review at 10–24
(cited in note 83); IDG News Service, Group Says e-Voting Paper Trail Wouldn’t Improve
Security, Computerworld (Sept 18, 2007), available at <http://www.computerworld.com/
action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyName=it_in_government&article
Id=9037399&taxonomyId=69&intsrc=kc_top> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Vaas, U.S. eVoting Lags, e-Week at 23 (cited in note 31). In 2006, computer scientist Professor Edward Felten analyzed an anonymously donated AccuVote-TS e-voting machine and discovered that the machine did not “authenticate” software—it would run any code a
hacker would install on an easily inserted flash-memory card. Thompson, Voting Machines, NY Times Magazine (cited in note 45).
86 Calandrino et al, Source Code Review at 10–24 (cited in note 83). One of the reports
explained that creating a voting machine virus would require moderate programming
skills and access to voting equipment, both of which are available. Id. Indeed, a Diebold
system was recently listed on eBay. Id.
87 Id at 24. Diebold’s systems also used C and C++ programming languages, which
are known to be prone to security problems. Id at 28–29.
88 Id.
89 Kim Zetter, Help Feds Build a Better Voting Machine, Wired (Sept 6, 2007), available at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/09/tell-uncle-sam-.html> (last visited Feb
24, 2008). Quite alarmingly, San Diego County named a former sales representative for
Diebold as its Registrar of voters. Kim Zetter, Former Diebold Sales Rep Becomes Registrar of Voters in San Diego, Wired (May 11, 2007), available at <http://blog.wired.com/
27bstroke6/2007/05/former_diebold_.html> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
90 Robert McMillan, California Puts Limits on Use of E-Voting Systems, Computerworld (Aug 13, 2007), available at <http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?
command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=300571> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
91 E-Vote: Colorado Tests Voting Equipment, Government Technology (cited in note
57).
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Data storage systems also lack adequate security, facilitating the release of sensitive personal information kept by agencies. Consider these data leaks from 2006 and 2007. Attackers
broke into the Department of Energy’s computer system and
stole Social Security numbers of federal employees. 92 Hackers
breached the Nebraska Treasurer’s system, stealing Social Security numbers and tax identification numbers from nine thousand
businesses. 93 The Chicago Voter Database was breached, compromising the Social Security numbers of 1.35 million residents. 94 Attackers invaded the online database of Iowa’s Department of Education, exposing sensitive personal data of six
hundred individuals. 95 The release of sensitive personal data
raises the risk of identity theft and stalking. 96
Current legal mechanisms have not sufficiently addressed
the security problems that afflict data storage systems. The EGovernment Act of 2002 97 (“E-Government Act”) requires federal
administrative agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments
(“PIAs”) when developing or purchasing systems that collect,
store, or disseminate personally identifiable information. 98 Pursuant to Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) guidance,
PIAs must identify and evaluate potential threats to privacy,
discuss alternatives, identify appropriate risk mitigation measures, and articulate the rationale for the final design choice. 99
The E-Government Act, however, has achieved mixed results
to date. 100 The incidence of agency noncompliance is significant:
12 percent of agencies do not have written processes or policies
92 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, available at <http://
www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. For instance, independent contractor Unisys Corporation built and managed
the information technology networks for the Transportation Security Administration and
the DHS headquarters. Nakashima and Krebs, Contractor Faulted, Wash Post (cited in
note 40). The closed nature of the system prevented the agency and the public from overseeing the system, which was subject to three months of cyber-intrusions by hackers. It
allowed Unisys to falsely certify that the network had been protected to cover up its lax
oversight. Id.
96 Citron, 80 S Cal L Rev at 251–52 (cited in note 9).
97 Pub L No 107-347, 116 Stat 2899.
98 44 USC § 3501 note (2000 & Supp 2002).
99 See Office of Management and Budget, OMB Guidance for Implementing the Privacy Provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002, M-03-22 (Sept 26, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/m03-22.html (visited June 16, 2008).
100 Kenneth A. Bamberger and Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in Administrative Agencies, 75 U Chi L Rev 75, 76, 81–82, 83 (2008) (arguing that PIA process
requirement is insufficient to address privacy concerns).
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for all listed aspects of PIAs and 16 percent of systems covered
by the PIA requirement did not have a complete or current
PIA. 101 As Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan have forcefully argued, the E-Government Act may have little chance of
future success in part due to the public’s inability to comment on
the design of systems whose specifications and source codes remain obscured. 102 An open code solution would tackle this problem.
The next Part suggests opening up these systems and explores why administrative law values support this proposal.
II. ENHANCING THE DEMOCRATIC AND EXPERT NATURE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE WITH OPEN CODE
Closed code inhibits public participation in the development
of critical information systems. Because the technical community
has no opportunity to identify a system’s problems, an uninformed public cannot press politically accountable actors to remedy them. With closed code, the expertise of a broader technical
community is unavailable to agencies.
An open code model has the potential to redress these problems. This Part begins by developing that model. Then, it demonstrates how open code governance can advance the transparency, democratic legitimacy, and expertise of the administrative
state.
A.

Open Code Proposal

The source code of critical information systems should be
open to the public. 103 Open code would reveal how a system
works, shedding light on the policies encoded in it. 104 It would
allow interested parties to discuss the assumptions that underlie

101

Id at 81.
Id at 88–89.
103 See, for example, Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the Future of the Net, 14 Berkeley Tech L J 759, 764 (1999) (arguing that open
code decreases the opportunity for government regulation of code).
104 David M. Berry and Giles Moss, Free and Open-Source Software: Opening and
Democratising e-Government’s Black Box, 11 Info Polity 21, 23 (2006) (discussing the
benefits of non-proprietary software). Software architect Jon Garfunkel suggests that
open business rules could run on top of a proprietary rules engine that constitutes the
system’s logic. Email from Jon Garfunkel, Senior Process Architect, Pegasystems, to
Danielle Keats Citron (Dec 20, 2007) (copy on file with author and U Chi Legal F).
102
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the digital processes. 105 And open code would permit inspection
of a system’s security features. 106
This proposal does not insist that agencies eliminate private
vendors and generate the code themselves, either by relying on
volunteer programmers or on government information technology departments. Instead, vendors constructing these systems
would be required to release the source code to the public before
their purchase or implementation. Just as procurement contracts
insist that government contractors refrain from discriminatory
practices, agencies could require that vendors make transparent
the source code for critical systems to facilitate public feedback
and executive oversight. Computer security expert Bruce
Schneier explains that systems built by private vendors whose
source codes are opened to the public offer both safety and reliability. 107
An open code model could be pursued in various ways. Agencies could insist on open code systems. Vendors would be required to release to the public a system’s specifications and
source code during the bidding process and before a purchased
system goes live. 108 To that end, the OMB could issue a circular
conditioning the provision of federal funding for technology purchases on the use of open code. 109 A state budget office could do
the same for local purchases receiving state aid.
For example, the San Francisco Elections Commission
(“Commission”) has issued a non-binding appeal to California’s
Department of Elections to “make reasonable efforts to select and
105 Camp, 135 Proceedings of the British Academy (cited in note 16). Programmers
should provide comments that explain why they wrote the code they way that they did
and exactly how they did it. See Posting of Rebecca Buckman, Men Write Code From
Mars, Women Write More Helpful Code From Venus, Wall St J Blog (June 6, 2008), available at <http://blogs.wsj.com/biztech/2008/06/06/men-write-code-from-mars-women-writemore-helpful-code-from-venus/> (last visited June 30, 2008). The code would then become
a roadmap for others who want to understand the policies embedded in it. Id. Emma
McGrattan, one of Silicon Valley’s highest-ranking programmers, has instituted new
coding standards at Ingres, where she is a senior vice-president of engineering, which
requires programmers to include a detailed set of comments before each block of code
explaining what the piece of code does and why and a detailed history of any changes
programmers make to the code. Id. I thank James Grimmelmann for this helpful point.
106 Wagner Testimony at 3 (cited in note 28).
107 Bruce Schneier, Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World 344 (Wiley
2004).
108 But see Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of
Information, 52 Duke L J 1245, 1275 (2003) (advocating that software written for government should be released as “free software” under relaxed licensing regime to enhance
the commons approach of software development).
109 I thank my colleague David Super for this insight.
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use voting systems technology, including hardware and software
that at a minimum is publicly disclosed.” 110 The Commission defined “public disclosure” as the right to inspect, test, and comment on technology during the procurement process. 111 Thus, if
adopted, this policy would require prospective vendors to release
their source codes during the bidding process.
Alternatively, legislators could mandate open code systems. 112 For instance, eighteen countries require the use of open
source software in government offices. 113 In 2006, the California
legislature held hearings on whether its electoral system should
use open source software. 114 The next sections provide normative
support for the use of open code software, relying on different
models of the administrative state.
B.

Participation Enhanced

Open code systems secure meaningful opportunities for public input, advancing the participatory model of administrative
law. This model promotes collaboration between the public and
agencies in setting and achieving policy goals. 115 Although the
value of public participation varies depending on the context, it
is viewed as generating better information for agency delibera-

110 San Francisco Elections Commission, Motions and Resolutions Passed by the San
Francisco Elections Commission in 2007, available at <http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/site/
electionscommission_index.asp?id=55693> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
111 Id.
112 See Jyh-An Lee, New Perspectives on Public Goods Production: Policy Implications
of Open Source Software, 9 Vand J of Enter & Tech L 45, 61 (2006) (explaining that Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands have all passed resolutions urging their governments
to use open-source software).
113 Id at 60 (explaining that national legislatures of Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Italy, Peru, Spain, and Ukraine require use of open-source
software in government offices).
114 Wayne Hanson, California Holds Hearing on Open Source Software in Election
Systems, Government Tech (eRepublic Feb 8, 2006), available at <http://www.govtech.
com/gt/articles/98361> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
115 This Article uses the term “participatory model” to refer to a constellation of theories of regulatory governance that envision regulation as the product of collective deliberation about regulatory goals and priorities. See, for example, Orly Lobel, The Renew
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought,
89 Minn L Rev 342, 377 (2004); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating
the Administrative Process, 98 Colum L Rev 1, 76 (1998). See also Cass R. Sunstein, After
the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Harvard 1990) (viewing governmental process as deliberation oriented to public good rather than series of interestgroup tradeoffs); Gerald E. Frug, Administrative Democracy, in David H. Rosenbloom and
Richard D. Schwartz, eds, Handbook of Regulation and Administrative Law 519, 520
(Marcel Dekker 1994).
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tion. 116 This model envisions participation as enhancing an
agency’s legitimacy by cultivating the public’s sense that it is
involved in, and bears responsibility for, government. 117 In addition, participation is understood as offsetting the influence of
well-organized interest groups through the inclusion of traditionally unrepresented interests. 118
An open code model creates new opportunities for diverse
groups to participate in the automated administrative state. 119
Networked technologies certainly make public participation easier and cheaper. 120 Digital networks facilitate peer production, a
process by which individuals, whose actions are not coordinated
either by managers or by market price signals, jointly produce
information. 121 Peer production facilitates collaboration among
“radically diverse” groups. 122 According to Yochai Benkler’s social
production theory, our networked information environment has
produced a popular culture that encourages active participation
116

Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge ix–x (Oxford
2006) (noting the author’s experience with public participation via blogs); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims 140 (Yale
1983) (explaining the ways in which participation and control could contribute to claimants’ sense of fairness); Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for
a New Age 258–59 (Cal 1984) (explaining the problem of uncertainty in politics and noting
that strong democratic politics encourages public participation); Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 Va L Rev 271, 272, 282
(1986) (explaining the possible risks of factional tyranny and self-interested representation to the administrative process, particularly in light of the insulation of administrators
from electoral control); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 Harv L Rev 1285 (2003) (arguing that privatization may provide a way for traditionally public goals to be reached); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:
Accounting for the New Religion, 116 Harv L Rev 1229, 1243 (2003) (arguing that favoring
privatization increases competition, which creates pressure to generate information that
may aid in administrative decisionmaking).
117 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L
Rev 1669, 1709 (1975).
118 Rossi, 92 Nw U L Rev at 211 (cited in note 17).
119 See Russell J. Dalton, The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is Reshaping
Politics 170 (CQ 2008) (explaining that younger Americans, such as members of Generation X and the Millennials, seem likely to seize upon new, networked opportunities for
public participation). Political science research reveals that newer generations tend to
connect with government through online public interest groups and internet discussion
forums. Id at 75. This proposal would tap into these peer-to-peer networks and enhance
the legitimacy of the administrative state.
120 See Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet—And How to Stop It 92 (Yale
2008) (explaining that the generative Internet and PC make political and artistic expression easier).
121 Benkler, 52 Duke L J at 1256 (cited in note 108).
122 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 232 (Yale 2006). See Brett M. Frischmann, Cultural Environment and
The Wealth of Networks, 74 U Chi L Rev 1083 (2007), for a thoughtful review of Yochai
Benkler’s The Wealth of Networks.

4/29/2008 5:04:26 PM

355]

OPEN CODE GOVERNANCE

375

in matters of public policy. 123 Such “commons-based” participation arguably deepens the legitimacy of government action. 124
Consider the online communities that exposed an e-voting
system’s flaws in 2003. Early that year, activist Bev Harris found
Diebold’s source code on the company’s website. 125 Harris posted
the source code on her website, urging viewers to examine and
distribute it to file-sharing networks. 126 Internet discussion forums avidly discussed the source code’s technical imperfections. 127 Computer scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice University reviewed the source code, posting their criticism on the
internet. 128
A few months later, a hacker sent Harris a cache of internal
Diebold emails that demonstrated the company knew that certain of its e-voting systems had problems. 129 After Harris posted
the emails on her website, college students widely distributed
them to peer-to-peer networks to keep the issue before the public. 130 In late 2003, California’s Voting Systems Panel (“Panel”)
launched an investigation into Diebold’s e-voting machines. 131
The Panel subsequently removed certain of the company’s evoting machines from the state’s voting precincts. 132
As the Diebold example suggests, revealing the source codes
to the public would allow individuals and groups to study the
accuracy and security of these systems. 133 For example, online
123

Benkler, The Wealth of Networks at 232 (cited in note 122).
Id.
125 Rubin, Brave New Ballot at 32 (cited in note 10).
126 Benkler, The Wealth of Networks at 232 (cited in note 122).
127 Harris, Black Box Voting at 104, 140–47 (cited in note 30).
128 Benkler, The Wealth of Networks at 227 (cited in note122). See Rubin, Brave New
Ballot (cited in note 10) (describing his role in exposing weaknesses in Diebold source
that Bev Harris discovered). Computer scientists found that a hacker could program a
voter card to let it cast as many votes as the hacker liked. Thompson, Voting Machines,
NY Times Magazine (cited in note 45).
129 Benkler, The Wealth of Networks at 227 (cited in note 122).
130 Id at 230.
131 Id.
132 Id at 231.
133 Berry and Moss, 11 Info Polity at 21 (cited in note 104); Andrew Chadwick, Bringing E-Democracy Back in: Why It Matters for Future Research on E-Governance, 21 Soc
Sci Computer Rev 443, 452 (2003); Wagner Testimony at 4 (cited in note 28); Douglas W.
Jones, Voting System Transparency and Security: The Need for Standard Models, Testimony before the Election Assistance Commission Technical Guidelines Development
Committee, National Institute of Standards and Technology (Sept 20, 2004), available at
<http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/nist2004.shtml> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Transparency and Access to Source Code in E-Voting (Berkeley Working Paper, 2006), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=909582> (last visited Feb 24,
2008).
124
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communities could evaluate a system’s design for hidden biases. 134 Programmers recruited by public interest groups could
check the policies embedded in automated decision-making systems like CBMS. They could provide feedback on the privacy and
security risks posed by proposed systems. 135
This feedback would exert pressure on agencies to fix problems at the margins that they might be inclined to ignore. Such
participation could enhance the public’s perception of these systems. 136 Indeed, the Netherlands has focused its e-Government
initiative on the adoption of open source software for the accuracy and legitimacy it brings. 137
The public’s participation could potentially combat interestgroup capture of agencies and cronyism. 138 Open code could illuminate agency decisions that advance the interests of powerful
groups. 139 For instance, if California’s Department of Elections
insists that vendors disclose their source codes during the bidding process, the technical community would have the opportunity to expose flaws in e-voting systems before election boards
sign procurement contracts. 140 Such feedback might inhibit an
134 Lessig, Code Version 2.0 at 102 (cited in note 68) (arguing that members of the
technical community now have power to restructure norms); Nissenbaum, How Computer
Systems Embody Values, Computer at 119 (cited in note 69) (noting that engineers now
face the challenge of building systems with certain moral properties).
135 See Bamberger and Mulligan, 75 U Chi L Rev at 89 (cited in note 100) (explaining
that because the PIA and other public documentation of e-Passport program did not provide the exact specifications of the system under consideration, the public could not review and test the proposed system). Professors Bamberger and Mulligan explain that the
E-Government Act lacks explicit mechanisms for public participation in the PIA process,
thus limiting opportunities for outside experts to assist the agency in identifying the
privacy implications of complex data storage systems. Id. at 87. Although no formal process for public participation is provided under the E-Government Act, this proposal would
enable outside groups and technicians to provide agencies with informal feedback on the
security features and privacy problems posed by proposed systems.
136 Berry and Moss, 11 Info Polity at 27 (cited in note 104). But see A. Michael Froomkin, Technologies for Democracy, in Peter M. Shane, ed, Democracy Online: The Prospects
for Political Renewal Through the Internet 15 (Routledge 2004) (describing initiatives in
England and Scotland that allow citizens to propose legislation via government website).
137 OSOSS Webpage, available at <http://www.ososs.nl/about_ososs> (last visited Feb
24, 2008).
138 The central concern here is that well-organized groups exercise disproportionate
influence over agency policymaking. Stewart, 88 Harv L Rev at 1684–1687 (cited in note
117). Scholars have argued that administrative law ought to promote deliberative rationality and to constrain the influence of special interest groups. Sunstein, 72 Va L Rev at
271–96 (cited in note 116).
139 Public choice theory contends that administrative regulation is little more than
private contracts that benefit interest groups at the public expense. Jerry L. Mashaw,
Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law 23–29 (Yale
1997).
140 See text accompanying notes 104–05 discussing San Francisco Elections Commis-
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agency’s inclination to pick vendors based on political connections. 141 Open code thus has the potential to address concerns
that special interests might dominate the procurement process. 142
The drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act aimed to
establish a system in which “citizens and representatives, operating through responsive but expert organs, would make deliberative decisions.” 143 Scholars lament that these democratic aspirations have not been realized. 144 Public participation has withered in part due to the complexity of regulatory issues, the power
of interest groups, and the expense of participation. 145
Closed systems make this problem worse. Open code, however, could reverse this trend. It could also facilitate the participation of individuals who previously had little connection with
the administrative state. As the next section discusses, informed
citizens could pressure elected officials to ensure the accuracy

sion’s recommendation that the state open up source code during procurement process.
141 I thank my colleague Rena Steinzor for this insight. Activists have similar concerns about the impartiality of the companies that certify e-voting systems because vendors pay for their services and because their certification reports are not public. Barr,
Bishop, and Gondree, Fixing Federal E-Voting Standards, Commun of the Assoc for Computing Machinery at 19 (cited in note 11). With few vendors selling e-voting machines, if
one certification firm is too demanding, it would lose a huge share of its business if the
vendor it criticized stops contracting with it. Indeed, it may be excluded from the industry
if other vendors follow suit. Concerns about the impartiality of CIBER, which has certified most of this country’s e-voting machines, were recently raised to the Federal Elections Assistance Commission. Kim Zetter, New York to Grill Voting Machine Testing Lab,
Wired (May 4, 2007), available at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/05/new_york_
to_gri.html> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). CIBER lost its accreditation to certify voting
machines in January 2007 due to its lax oversight of vendors’ e-voting systems. Christopher Drew, Citing Problems, U.S. Bars Lab from Testing Electronic Voting, NY Times A1
(Jan 4, 2007). CIBER had been criticized for missing security and reliability problems
long before its suspension. Id. See also Douglas W. Jones, Misassessment of Security in
Computer-Based Election Systems, Cryptobytes at 9 (Fall 2004).
142 Samir Chopra and Scott Dexter argue that the opacity of e-voting systems’ design
is a “secret compact between governments and manufacturers . . ., who alone are privy to
the details of the voting process.” Samir Chopra and Scott D. Dexter, Decoding Liberation: The Promise of Free and Open Source Software 169 (Routledge 2007).
143 Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 322–326 (Oxford 1997). Nelson
Rosenbaum explains that a major concern of the drafters of the Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946 was the “perception that the interests of most citizens were being disregarded
by a group of decision-making institutions that increasingly affected important aspects of
their lives.” Nelson M. Rosenbaum, Citizen Participation and Democratic Theory, in Stuart Langton, ed, Citizen Participation in America: Essays on the State of the Art 43, 45
(Lexington 1978). The statutory mandates authorizing citizen participation recognized
the need to empower citizens to insure administrative fairness and accountability. Id.
144 Sunstein, Free Markets at 322 (cited in note 143).
145 Id. See also Rosenbaum, Citizen Participation at 48 (cited in note 143) (“Citizen
participation can be extremely costly, unwieldy, and time-consuming.”).
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and security of critical automated systems, amplifying their officials’ political accountability.
C.

Political Accountability Facilitated

This proposal should also appeal to supporters of a strong
executive model of administrative law. This model views presidential and gubernatorial influence over agency action as enhancing the administrative state’s accountability by creating an
“electoral link between the public and the bureaucracy.” 146 Presidents and governors concern themselves with an agency’s effectiveness because the public holds chief executive officers responsible for governmental performance. 147 Thus, executive officers
and their senior staff work to ensure that agencies achieve their
“objectives, without undue cost, in an expeditious and coherent
manner” to ensure reelection. 148 The model contends that presidential administrations would be more likely to consider the
preferences of the general public, rather than just parochial interests. 149
This Article’s proposal closes the information gap between a
system’s designers and the public, allowing the public to formulate more focused, informed complaints about a troubled system
and to present those complaints to chief executive officers. 150
Senior executive staff could then respond to the public’s specific
concerns. The specificity of the public’s complaints would make it
harder for agencies to ignore them. At the same time, an open
code approach would make it easier to hold an agency accountable for its response to such complaints.

146

Sunstein, Free Markets at 322 (cited in note 143).
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv L Rev 2245, 2335 (2001);
Cynthia R. Farina, The “Chief Executive” and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution, 49
Admin L Rev 179, 180-84 (1997) (addressing the impact of chief executives on “regulatory
enterprise”).
148 Id. Advocates of this view argue it is equally applicable to executives whose desire
for reelection is strong and to those who cannot serve again given their interest in their
historical legacy. This view notes that the accountability point should not be overstated.
The resolution of any particular regulatory issue plays a small role in the public’s perception of presidential performance. See id.
149 Sunstein, Free Markets at 325 (cited in note 143); D. Stephen Cupps, Emerging
Problems of Citizen Participation, 37 Pub Admin Rev 478 (1977).
150 This proposal would facilitate the transparency necessary for the operation of this
model. Unlike software whose accuracy is unmistakably clear from its operation, such as
life-critical systems like aircraft software, problems in closed code often remain hidden. In
many instances, it may not be clear to the public that a problem even exists that needs
correction.
147
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Colorado’s experience with CBMS demonstrates the point. In
response to both a lawsuit filed by public interest groups about
the failure of CBMS, and media coverage of the issue, Colorado’s
Governor created a new agency position charged with fixing
CBMS. 151 Similarly, in 2007, California’s Secretary of State
launched an investigation of the state’s e-voting systems after
public interest groups expressed concerns about voter disenfranchisement. 152
The next section explores how open code model would protect and amplify the expertise of agency decision-making.
D. Expertise Advanced
The technical community’s input would advance the expertise model of administrative law, which emphasizes an agency’s
role in bringing specialized knowledge into the political domain. 153 An agency’s expertise allows it to communicate with
substantive experts, identify better experts, and assess which
insights can be turned into workable administrative practices. 154
Agencies have the capacity to bring together specialized personnel and data, facilitating comprehensive analysis that generalist
legislatures cannot match. 155 This model depends upon agencies
having the necessary expertise and information available to it. 156
The input of interested programmers could advance agency
expertise in two critical ways. First, programmers could ensure
that programming mistakes do not defeat an agency’s own expertise. For instance, technicians working with public interest firms
151 Bill Scanlon, Benefits System Director Named, Denver Rocky Mtn News 28A (May
28, 2005).
152 See text accompanying notes 83–91.
153 See Stephen G. Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems,
Text, and Cases 182–85 (Aspen 6th ed 2006); Landis, The Administrative Process at 23–28
(cited in note 18) (explaining that expertise is a critical characteristic of agencies and the
pressing need that engendered them).
154 Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
59–63 (Harvard 1993) (advocating a focus on expertise in administrative decisionmaking).
Bruce Ackerman is another prominent advocate of focusing on expertise in administrative
law. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv L Rev 633, 697–715
(2000).
155 See Mashaw, Due Process at 19 (cited in note 2) (explaining that the creation of
prominent administrative agencies emerged as a result of the need for more specialized
expertise); Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 73–74 (cited in note 154).
156 Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice at 50 (cited in note 116) (explaining that the ideal of
instrumental rationality in the context of particular administrative programs depends on
a variety of conditions including whether administrators have all of the facts that are
relevant to decisionmaking).
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could catch programming errors that alter established policy in
systems such as CBMS. 157 That feedback would allow an agency
to insist that its vendor fix the code to reflect the agency’s own
policy choices.
Second, the technical community would provide agencies
with crucial data to make optimal decisions. The expertise model
extols agencies for their “capacity to bring together information
on the beneficial and detrimental aspects of regulatory alternatives.” 158 Closed systems prevent agencies from fulfilling that
role. Open code would allow agencies to leverage the expertise of
a broad technical community in making procurement decisions
and in reviewing systems. 159 This proposal would provide an inexpensive means to enhance the expertise of agency decisionmaking.
Such expert input is particularly important for agencies that
do not have access to such expertise either in-house or through
outside advisors. 160 For instance, election officials currently lack
sufficient information to conduct rigorous reviews of e-voting systems. 161 Election officials do not know enough about how the machines operate to assess them. 162 As the elections supervisor of
Florida’s Leon County explained: vendors control all of the information about their e-voting machines and will not “tell me
that [ ] buggy software is why I can’t get the right time on [the
machines’] audit logs.” 163 If the systems’ vendors made the source
codes public, computer scientists and academics could help local
and state election officials in checking these systems. 164 In other
cases, the technical community could assess data storage sys-

157

See Citron, 85 Wash U L Rev (cited in note 8).
McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 114 (cited in note 4).
159 See, for example, Joana Matos Penha-Lopes, Why Use an Open Source E-Voting
System?, 37 Assoc for Computing Machinery Special Interest Group on Computer Sci Ed
Bulletin 412 (Sept 2005); Bruce Schneier, What’s Wrong with Electronic Voting Machines?, openDemocracy (Nov 9, 2004), available at <http://www.opendemocracy.net/
media-voting/article_2213.jsp> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Raba Technologies, Trusted
Agent Report: Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System (2004), available at <http://www.
raba.com/press/TA_Report_AccuVote.pdf> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
160 But See Bamberger and Mulligan, 75 U Chi L Rev at 100 (cited in note 100) (attributing success of Chief Privacy Officer of Department of Homeland Security Nuala
O’Connor Kelly to, in part, her ability to build a staff with varied privacy training and
expertise who actively participated in privacy associations and conferences).
161 Rubin, Brave New Ballot at 24 (cited in note 10).
162 Thompson, Voting Machines, NY Times Magazine (cited in note 45).
163 Id.
164 Wagner Testimony at 4 (cited in note 28).
158
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tems for security vulnerabilities. 165 Programmers could inspect
systems to ensure that they comply with privacy laws. 166 In
short, the technical community’s feedback would promote an
agency’s expertness. 167
III. OBJECTIONS TO AN OPEN CODE MODEL
This proposal, of course, is not free from serious objections.
This Part evaluates three central concerns about an open code
model and concludes that this proposal deserves adoption. First,
this proposal may face implementation and cost constraints.
Agencies may be unable to insist that their vendors reveal the
source code under current contract terms. In that case, the cost
of switching systems would be a serious concern. A new system
may require investments in equipment and staff training. 168 For
instance, the Census Bureau recently dedicated significant resources implementing CPS that it would not want to repeat. 169
Vendors also may raise their systems’ cost if forced to reveal
their source codes.
A switch, however, has the potential to reduce long-term
costs, especially for troubled systems, such as e-voting machines
and automated public benefits systems, which require substantial resources to fix. Over the past three years, Colorado has
spent millions of dollars working on CBMS, which continues to
be plagued by problems. 170 Texas’s adoption of a flawed auto165 Of course not all security leaks relate to a system’s flaws. Some are attributed to
human error like the Veterans Administration employee who took home a laptop containing millions of SSNs of veterans and the laptop was stolen. See David Stout, Veterans
Agency to Atone with Free Credit Monitoring, NY Times A22 (June 22, 2006).
166 Berry and Moss, 11 Info Polity at 30 (cited in note 104) (noting alternatives to
available products that store user information in a more covert manner). See generally
Solove, The Digital Person at 68–71 (cited in note 42).
167 Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of
Bureaucracy 22 (Yale 1990) (arguing that outside participation increases agency expertise
by giving people affected by administrative rules the opportunity to be heard and by
negating the tendency of agencies to exercise power in an arbitrary way).
168 Lee, 9 Vand J Enter & Tech L at 73 (cited in note 112) (explaining that the costs of
switching to a new system may be too high for governments to have an incentive to adopt
an open code system).
169 Horvath Email (cited in note 33) (explaining that “[h]aving just undergone the
lengthy and difficult behind-the-scenes conversion to Blaise, we are unlikely to [move
towards open source software and] repeat that process in the foreseeable future”).
170 Jerd Smith, Audit: Costly Errors in Computer System for Benefits Had High Mistake Rate, Denver Rocky Mtn News 4A (Apr 19, 2006) (explaining that errors in computing system may cost Colorado as much as $10 million); Bill Scanlon, Millions Spent on
Welfare Fix, Denver Rocky Mtn News 6A (Sept 3, 2005) (explaining that CBMS is “clumsy
to use, has great trouble generating reports, requires users to work around kinks and
makes mistakes issuing benefits”); Scanlon, Benefits System Director Named at 28A (cited
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mated public benefits system similarly wasted hundreds of millions of dollars, eventually requiring the state to replace its initial vendor with another firm. 171 Open code would allow agencies
and their vendors to enjoy feedback about a system’s accuracy
and security from programmers whose services are virtually free.
Significantly, the benefits of a more transparent and legitimate system should not be undervalued. Open code would provide opportunities for public participation, political accountability, and expertise that are now absent. It might prevent the disenfranchisement of voters and ensure greater accuracy in decision-making systems. Agencies and legislatures should consider
the short-term costs of a new system with the long-term savings
of a more accurate, secure, and legitimate open system.
Critics may argue that vendors will refuse to build open systems that reveal their trade secrets. They may suggest that vendors will wait to see who moves first so they can free-ride on another’s investments in research and development, resulting in
stasis. 172 A first-mover problem, however, may be illusory for two
reasons.
First, the high price tag of procurement contracts strongly
suggests that vendors will design these systems. Because the
government is the sole buyer in these markets, vendors will meet
its conditions rather than dropping out of the market altogether.
Indeed, in January 2008, Diebold spokesman Chris Riggall noted
that “the company is considering making the software open
source on its next generation of touch-screen machines” due to
growing pressure from states. 173 As Riggall explains: “if the expectations of our customers change, we’ll have to respond to that
reality.” 174
Second, vendors already have embraced the open code model
given its potential for lucrative contracts. For instance, Open
Voting Solutions, an e-voting machine vendor whose source code
would be publicly available, has submitted proposals to boards of
elections in New York. 175
in note 151) (noting decision to create a position to correct the problems with CBMS).
171 Patrick Michels, The Tale of TIERS: Lessons from the Epic Pursuit of the Perfect
Records Management System 29 Government Tech (eRepublic Sept 2007).
172 Cindy Cohn of the Electronic Frontier Foundation raised this issue at the “Law in
a Networked World” symposium.
173 Thompson, Voting Machines, NY Times Magazine (cited in note 45).
174 Id.
175 See Open Voting Consortium Website Press Release, Vendor Applies for Open
Voting Consortium Certification (Oct 15, 2006), available at <http://www.
openvotingconsortium.org/node/82> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
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If a first-mover disadvantage does arise, then states could
band together in a consortium to purchase systems, splitting the
costs of research and development. A first-move disadvantage
supports the OMB’s involvement in this issue. The OMB could
help coordinate purchasing or have federal agencies purchase en
masse for all of the states that participate in programs that they
run. 176 Between the software the OMB buys directly and that it
funds, it dominates the market. Given the important public policy concerns at stake, the government has every right to use its
market power to ensure that products meeting its specifications
are available.
The second objection involves skepticism about whether this
Article’s proposal would generate the benefits that it promises.
Some may question whether a broader technical audience would,
in fact, review the source code of certain systems. 177 The typical
open source project only has a small number of contributors. 178
That surely would not be true of high-profile systems, such as evoting machines. As Professor Wagner has explained, and as
past practice makes clear, open code e-voting systems would attract “the country’s best independent technical experts to analyze
the source code and publish their findings.” 179 Such projects generate interest due to the reputational advantages of participating
in such projects. 180
Consider Australia’s open code e-voting project. A private
company designed Australia’s e-voting system and posted all of
the drafts of its source code online for review and criticism. 181
Interested programmers and independent auditors studied the
source code and provided feedback. 182 An Australian National
University professor caught the most serious problem. 183 The
vendor, in turn, fixed the source code, shoring up the system’s

176 It is naturally true that states need a great deal of customization for systems depending upon how they administer a program and what policies they have selected for
those programs.
177 Jason Kitcat, Source Availability and E-Voting: An Advocate Recants, Commun of
the Assoc for Computing Machinery 65, 66 (Oct 2004) (arguing that the more likely scenario is that the majority of open code would be ignored by the broader audience). Paul
Ohm raised this concern at the “Law in a Networked World” symposium.
178 Kitcat, Source Availability at 66 (cited in note 177).
179 Wagner Testimony at 4 (cited in note 28).
180 Sunstein, Infotopia at 148 (cited in note 116).
181 Moynihan, 64 Pub Admin Rev at 524 (cited in note 45).
182 Id.
183 Id.
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security. 184 Australia’s e-voting system has received broad praise
for its reliability and security. 185 Similarly, computer scientists
working for the Open Voting Consortium have begun programming open source software for election systems in the United
States. 186
Systems affecting interest groups also would receive attention. One might imagine that public interest groups would direct
significant energies to ensuring the accuracy of automated decision systems such as CBMS. Programmers might also review the
source code for public benefits systems due to a sense that they
are part of a meaningful social project. 187
Although the chances of review are reduced for low-profile
systems, the possibility is never completely absent or predictable.
Indeed, computer security academics might ask students to assess such systems. Even if the source code of systems is not actually studied, important benefits remain. Those who believe that
their work will be reviewed are more careful. 188 Due to the reputational costs of sloppy work, source code disclosure gives vendors a powerful incentive to ensure that their code is free of problems. 189 Thus, the open code model may inspire vendors to more
thoroughly check the code’s accuracy and security even for obscure programs.
The third objection concerns the security of open code systems. Software manufacturers argue that open code would enhance a system’s vulnerability. 190 The computer security literature, however, rejects the notion that secrecy ensures a system’s

184

Id.
Vaas, U.S. E-voting Lags, e-Week at 23 (cited in note 31); Kim Zetter, Building a
Better Voting Machine, Wired (Oct 18, 2006), available at <http://www.wired.com/politics/
security/news/2006/10/71957> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Ananya Das, Yuan Niu, and Till
Stegers, Security Analysis of the eVACS Open Source Voting System (2005), available at
<http://wwwcsif.cs.ucdavis.edu/~stegers/eVACS-final-report.pdf> (last visited Feb 24,
2008).
186 Open
Voting Consortium, The Solution: Open Voting, available at
<http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
187 Sunstein, Infotopia at 160–62 (cited in note 116).
188 As Jeremy Bentham initially observed, the fear of observation results in increased
obedience and discipline. Solove, The Digital Person at 98 (cited in note 42); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 200 (Pantheon 1977) (Alan Sheridan,
trans). By contrast, vendors who keep their source code secret are more likely to be
sloppy. Schneier, Secrets and Lies at 344 (cited in note 107).
189 Wagner Testimony at 5 (cited in note 28).
190 Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values,
73 Fordham L Rev 1711, 1794 (2005) (explaining the pros and cons of the “security
through obscurity” approach taken by software users in restricting access to code).
185
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safety. 191 This literature explains that security is not achieved by
concealing security defects, but instead by allowing interested
programmers to identify flaws that need to be fixed. 192 Open code
enlarges the available pool of intelligence, enabling a community
of testers to identify bugs and problems with the code. 193 Because it is more likely that flaws will be discovered if the source
code is available for inspection, computer scientists advocate
open e-voting systems. 194 The only security measures that must
remain secret are a system’s changeable secrets, such as its
passwords and cryptographic keys. 195
At the same time, revealing the source code incurs only a
low-level of risk. 196 Unlike a warring nation that learns much
from discovering an enemy’s military plans, computer attackers
learn little from the disclosure of a system’s source code. 197 This
is because computer security measures, such as firewalls, have a
low level of uniqueness. 198 As a result, attackers can find a system’s flaws without the source code. 199
Studies demonstrate that open source software provides better security than proprietary software. 200 For this reason, agencies with salient security requirements, such as the Department
191 Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in
C (Wiley 2d ed 1996); Schneier, Secrets and Lies at 344 (cited in note 107) (arguing that
safety may not be ensured by a software’s secrecy). Some computer scientists, however,
suggest that whether a system is open or closed makes no difference as to security in the
long run. See Hearing Before California Senate Elections Committee, The Relative Merits
of Openness in Voting Systems (testimony of Peter G Neumann) (Feb 8, 2006), available
at <http://www.csl.sri.com/users/neumann/calsen06.pdf> (last viewed Feb 24, 2008).
192 Schneier, Applied Cryptography (cited in note 191).
193 Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open
Source by an Accidental Revolutionary 19 (O’Reilly rev ed 2001) (“Given enough eyeballs,
all bugs are shallow.”); Wagner Testimony at 4 (cited in note 28); Peter P. Swire, A Model
for When Disclosure Helps Security: What Is Different About Computer and Network Security?, 3 J Telecommun & High Tech L 163, 169 (2005) (arguing that multiple users are
more likely to identify and correct flaws in the code). A corollary point is that the soundness of a decision grows the more diverse the minds inspecting it. For a general discussion, see Sunstein, Infotopia (cited in note 116).
194 Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Immediate Steps to Avoid Lost Votes in the
2004 Presidential Election: Recommendations for the Election Assistance Commission
(2004), available at <http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/EAC.pdf> (last visited
Feb 24, 2008); Berry and Moss, 11 Info Polity at 26 (cited in note 104).
195 Schneier, Secrets and Lies at 344 (cited in note 107).
196 Swire, 3 J Telecommun & High Tech L at 168 (cited in note 193).
197 Id at 168.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Jaap-Henk Hoepman and Bart Jacobs, Increased Security Through Open Source,
Commun of the Assoc for Computing Machinery 79, 81 (Jan 2007) (“We believe that open
source software is a necessary requirement to build systems that are more secure.”).
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of Defense and the National Security Agency, have adopted
Linux operating systems. 201 The Departments of Veterans Affairs, Defense, and Health and Human Services employ open
source software to maintain patient health records. 202 California’s Air Resource Board runs 65 percent of its databases on
open source software for the security that it offers. 203
This proposal, however, has its limits. It should not apply
when the importance of secrecy outweighs the transparency, democratic legitimacy, and expertise open code brings. The exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) disclosure
requirements provide insight into situations where public policy
concerns might support a closed code regime. 204
Consider these examples. FOIA excludes information compiled by law enforcement from public disclosure if producing such
information would reveal “techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations.” 205 The IRS’s auditing software might
qualify as code that should remain closed in order to prevent individuals from gaming the system. The “No Fly” data matching
program seemingly falls within FOIA’s exemption from disclosure information that would “endanger the life or physical safety
of any individual.” 206 Its source code should not be opened on the
grounds that terrorists could evade detection if they knew the
system’s logic. 207
201 Hal R. Varian and Carl Shapiro, Linux Adoption in the Public Sector: An Economic
Analysis 10, (Dec 1, 2003), available at <http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/2004/
linux-adoption-in-the-public-sector.pdf> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); John Rendleman,
Navy CIO OKs Open Source Systems, Government Computer News (June 8, 2007), available at <http://www.gcn.com/online/vol1_no1/44441-1.html> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
202 The Veterans Administration received the Award for Innovation in American Government from the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard
University’s Kennedy School of Government for its health information system. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, VistA Frequently Asked Questions 1 (July 10, 2006), available at <http://www.innovations.va.gov/innovations/docs/InnovationsVistAFAQPublic.
pdf> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). Patient health information is safeguarded with valid
encryption system and secure access code. Id at 2.
203 Ellen Perlman, Open Sorcerer, Governing (May 2006), available at <http://
governing.com/articles/5open.htm> (last visited Feb 24, 2008) (explaining that open
source code is less vulnerable to viruses than proprietary software). By contrast, a recent
study of 227 information technology systems currently in use in the administrative state
gave those systems failing marks for security. David A. Powner, US Government Accountability Office, Rep No GAO-07-1211T, Information Technology: Further Improvements Needed to Identify and Oversee Poorly Planned and Performing Projects 3 (2007)
(explaining that nearly all of those systems employed closed, proprietary code).
204 5 USC § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2000 & Supp 2004). So too would exceptions to state openrecord laws.
205 5 USC § 552(b)(7)(E).
206 Id.
207 See Citron, 85 Wash U L Rev at 1286 (cited in note 8) (arguing that algorithms of
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To that end, this Article’s proposal should provide a presumption of open code that could be rebutted by other important
public policy concerns. Evidence of such public policy concerns,
however, should be carefully reviewed. The administrative law
values that an open code regime secures should not be forsaken
without clear justification.
CONCLUSION
Critics of the administrative state are troubled by its opacity
and lack of democratic pedigree. Agencies’ closed information
systems exacerbate these concerns. This Article argues that
opening up the source code of these systems can combat these
problems by illuminating agency decisions bound up in these systems. An open code model would secure the participation of a
technical community that has previously played no role in the
administrative state. And more importantly, this proposal would
enhance the political accountability and expertise of agency decision-making.

“No Fly” program should be subjected to review of the Independent Advisory Board to
ensure due process protections).

